Unlawful assault - Mens Rea (cf: stalking)

Felix Ralph·31 Jul 2026

Mental Elements for Unlawful Assault

Introduction

Unlawful assault in Victoria requires proof of both a physical act (actus reus) and a fault element (mens rea). The mental element for unlawful assault is an intention to produce fear of unlawful physical contact with the victim, or recklessness in the sense that the accused realised their conduct may have that effect and persisted with it regardless. This is distinct from the mental elements required for other offences such as stalking, which involve different fault requirements.

The Governing Principle

The leading Victorian authority on the mental elements of unlawful assault is the decision of Nettle J (as his Honour then was) in Thomas v Campbell [2003] VSC 460.1 In that case, his Honour undertook a detailed analysis of the elements of unlawful assault and distinguished them from the elements of stalking. The critical passage sets out both the actus reus and mens rea of unlawful assault.

This formulation was subsequently endorsed and applied by the Court of Appeal in Sawyer v R [2021] VSCA 282,2 where the same passage was quoted with approval.

The Two Alternative Mental States

The mental element for unlawful assault can therefore be satisfied in one of two ways.

Intention: The accused must have intended to produce in the victim's mind the fear of immediate unlawful physical contact. This is a subjective state of mind — what the accused actually intended, not what a reasonable person would have intended.

Recklessness: Alternatively, the accused must have realised that their conduct might produce such fear in the victim, and nevertheless persisted with that conduct. As Nettle J explained, recklessness in this context means "realisation that it may have that effect, and still persisting with it." This is also a subjective test — it requires that the accused actually foresaw the possibility of the relevant consequence, not merely that a reasonable person would have foreseen it.

The Relationship Between Unlawfulness and Mental State

The question of whether the prosecution must prove that the accused was aware the complainant was not consenting (where lack of consent is an element of the offence) was considered in Parish v DPP . In that case, the Court observed that the word "unlawful" imports an essential element of the offence of assault, and that the principle from R v Morgan — that belief in consent entitles a defendant to an acquittal — applies to the element of assault where lack of consent is an element.

This means that where the unlawfulness of the assault depends on the absence of consent, the prosecution must prove that the accused was aware the complainant was not consenting or might not be consenting. This is consistent with the broader principle that the mental element of an offence extends to all elements of the actus reus.

The mental element for unlawful assault can therefore be satisfied in one of two ways.

Intention: The accused must have intended to produce in the victim's mind the fear of immediate unlawful physical contact. This is a subjective state of mind — what the accused actually intended, not what a reasonable person would have intended.

Recklessness: Alternatively, the accused must have realised that their conduct might produce such fear in the victim, and nevertheless persisted with that conduct. As Nettle J explained, recklessness in this context means "realisation that it may have that effect, and still persisting with it." This is also a subjective test — it requires that the accused actually foresaw the possibility of the relevant consequence, not merely that a reasonable person would have foreseen it.

The Relationship Between Unlawfulness and Mental State

The question of whether the prosecution must prove that the accused was aware the complainant was not consenting (where lack of consent is an element of the offence) was considered in Parish v DPP . In that case, the Court observed that the word "unlawful" imports an essential element of the offence of assault, and that the principle from R v Morgan — that belief in consent entitles a defendant to an acquittal — applies to the element of assault where lack of consent is an element.

This means that where the unlawfulness of the assault depends on the absence of consent, the prosecution must prove that the accused was aware the complainant was not consenting or might not be consenting. This is consistent with the broader principle that the mental element of an offence extends to all elements of the actus reus.

Distinction from Other Offences

The mental element for unlawful assault is narrower than that required for some other offences. In Thomas v Campbell1, Nettle J drew a clear contrast with the mental element for stalking:

"The mens rea for stalking is an intention to cause physical or mental harm or of arousing apprehension or fear in the victim for the victim's own safety or that of any other person."

This distinction is significant because it means that the two offences have different fault elements, and a person may be convicted of both offences arising from the same factual circumstances without offending the rule against double punishment, as the Court of Appeal confirmed in Sawyer v R2:

"The elements of stalking are not the same as the elements of unlawful assault and not all of the elements of either offence are included in the elements of the other."

In Sawyer at [52] citing Nettle J in Thomas v Campbell with approval their Honours Forrest and Priest JJA note the following distinction:

The elements of stalking are not the same as the elements of unlawful assault and not all of the elements of either offence are included in the elements of the other. The actus reus of unlawful assault is an act raising in the mind of the victim the fear of immediate violence to the victim. Contrastingly, the actus reus of stalking is engaging in a course of conduct that includes acting in a way that could reasonably be expected to arouse apprehension or fear in the victim for his own safety or that of any other person, where the course of conduct engaged in actually has that effect. The mens rea for assault is an intention to produce fear of unlawful physical contact with the victim or recklessness (in the sense of realisation that it may have that effect, and still persisting with it). The mens rea for stalking is an intention to cause physical or mental harm or of arousing apprehension or fear in the victim for the victim’s own safety or that of any other person. Consequently, it would not be necessary to prove an offence of unlawful assault in order to prove an offence of stalking and equally proof of an offence of assault would not be enough to establish an offence of stalking.

In some cases, of which this appears to be one, the acts which are relied upon as establishing a course of conduct amounting to stalking may also be relied upon as establishing individual assaults. But even in those cases the elements of the offence of stalking are still not the same as the elements of the individual assaults.[23]3 A person cannot be convicted of two offences of which one is merely an aggravated form of the other, but as has already been seen, stalking is not merely an aggravated form of assault, and the fact that both offences may arise out of the same facts is not enough in itself to preclude conviction of both offences. While there are circumstances in which an accused should not be charged with more than one offence arising out of the same facts — and if he is and is convicted on both, the conviction on one is liable to be set aside — that will not be the case where the principles essayed in R v Newman and Turnbull[24]4 mandate that both charges be joined together.[25]5 In my opinion this is a case in which those principles may apply. The ‘course of conduct’ which is the essence of the offence of stalking creates the potential — if not the inevitable consequence — that in some circumstance the charge of stalking will be more serious than any individual offences which constitute the course of conduct and in other circumstances charges of individual assault will be far more serious than the charge of stalking.[26]6

Application in Manslaughter by Unlawful and Dangerous Act

The mental element for unlawful assault also has significance in the context of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act. In R v Sypott [2003] VSC 32773, the Court observed that where an unlawful act constitutes an assault on the victim and death results, the crime will be manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act, but the prosecution need not establish that the accused intended to commit a dangerous act:

"It is unnecessary for the prosecution to establish that one charged with manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act intended to commit a dangerous act. It is enough that it is established that the act committed was unlawful and that viewed objectively it was dangerous."

However, the prosecution must still establish any mental element involved in the ingredient of unlawfulness — which, in the case of an assault, includes the mental element described above.

Conclusion

The mental element for unlawful assault in Victoria is constituted by either an intention to produce fear of immediate unlawful physical contact in the victim, or recklessness in the sense that the accused realised their conduct might have that effect and persisted regardless. Where the unlawfulness of the assault depends on the absence of consent, the prosecution must also prove that the accused was aware the complainant was not consenting or might not be. These mental elements are distinct from those required for other offences such as stalking, and they operate within the broader framework of criminal responsibility, including in the context of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act.

Footnotes

  1. 1 Thomas v Campbell [2003] VSC 460.
  2. 2 Sawyer v The Queen [2021] VSCA 282.
  3. 3 Ibid [23].
  4. 4 Ibid [24].
  5. 5 Ibid [25].
  6. 6 Ibid [26].
  7. 7 R v John William Sypott [2003] VSC 327.

Request access, or sign in.