Sentencing - Delay - Tones v The Queen [2017] VSCA 118

Felix Ralph·31 Jul 2026

Tones v The Queen [2017] VSCA 118 — Delay as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing

Introduction
This is an appeal against sentence brought by David Tones, who was convicted by a jury of 12 charges of sexual offending against two teenage girls. The central issue on appeal was whether the sentencing judge gave sufficient weight to the extraordinary six-year delay between the appellant being interviewed by police and being charged. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the delay was egregious, the individual sentences and total effective sentence were moderate and well within range, and it could be inferred that the judge had significantly discounted the sentences to reflect the delay.

Background and Facts
The appellant was found guilty by a jury in the County Court of six charges of sexual penetration of a child under 16 and six charges of indecent act with a child under 16. The offending occurred between 2005 and 2007 against two complainants, 'A' (aged 13) and 'C' (aged 14–15). The appellant was aged 39–41 at the time of the offending.

The complainants made statements to police on 15 November 2007, and the appellant was interviewed on 19 December 2007, denying any wrongdoing. For reasons that were not apparent to the Court — and through no fault of the appellant — he was not charged until December 2013, a delay of approximately six years.

Parties and Court
The appeal was heard by Maxwell P, Redlich and Kyrou JJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal. The appellant was represented by Mr P S Kilduff, and the Crown by Mr C B Boyce SC.

Charges and Sentencing
The appellant was sentenced on 17 August 2016 as follows:”

Charge

Offence

Maximum

Sentence

Cumulation

5

Indecent act with a child under 16

10 years

12 months

6 months

8

Indecent act with a child under 16

10 years

12 months

1 month

9

Indecent act with a child under 16

10 years

12 months

1 month

10

Sexual penetration of a child under 16

10 years

3 years

9 months

11

Indecent act with a child under 16

10 years

18 months

3 months

13

Sexual penetration of a child under 16

10 years

3 years

9 months

14

Indecent act with a child under 16

10 years

18 months

3 months

15

Sexual penetration of a child under 16

10 years

3 years

9 months

16

Sexual penetration of a child under 16

10 years

3 years

9 months

17

Indecent act with a child under 16

10 years

12 months

1 month

18

Sexual penetration of a child under 16

10 years

3 years

4 months

19

Sexual penetration of a child under 16

10 years

3 years

Base

Total Effective Sentence

7 years 7 months

Non-Parole Period

5 years 3 months

Parties and Court

The appeal was heard by Maxwell P, Redlich and Kyrou JJA in the Victorian Court of Appeal. The appellant was represented by Mr P S Kilduff, and the Crown by Mr C B Boyce SC.

The sole ground of appeal was that the sentences were manifestly excessive. The appellant's argument focused on whether the sentencing judge had given proper weight to the delay as a mitigating factor, particularly given that delay had been identified on the plea as "the main factor in mitigation."

The Two Limbs of Delay

The Court of Appeal confirmed that delay can be a powerful mitigating factor, comprising two distinct limbs. The first limb concerns unfairness to the offender — the anxiety of having the prospect of a charge "hanging over" the accused's head. The second limb concerns rehabilitation — whether during the period of delay the offender made progress towards rehabilitation and demonstrated good prospects of ongoing rehabilitation.1

"It is well established that significant delay between the time that an offender is interviewed by police and the time that charges are laid, and delay between the laying of charges and trial, can be a powerful mitigating factor. There are two limbs to delay. The first limb concerns unfairness to the offender, in the sense that the relevant charge — or the prospect of such a charge — was 'hanging over' the accused's head and caused him or her anxiety ('unfairness limb'). The second limb concerns whether, during the period of the delay, the offender made progress towards rehabilitation and whether there were good prospects of ongoing rehabilitation ('rehabilitation limb')."

The Evidentiary Requirement

The Court held that where an offender relies on either limb of delay, they will ordinarily be expected to adduce some evidence to support it, unless there is a concession from the Crown or an intimation that the judge will act on submissions from the Bar table.2

"Where an offender relies on either limb of delay as a mitigating factor, the offender will be expected — unless there is a concession from the Crown or an intimation that the judge will act on submissions from the Bar table — to adduce some evidence to support them."

In the present case, no evidence was adduced of the effect of the delay on the appellant. However, the prosecutor did not cavil with the assertion from the Bar table that the prospect of being charged hung over the appellant's head. The judge was therefore entitled to take into account the unfairness of the delay.

The Rehabilitation Limb — Remorse and Reformation

The Court identified two aspects to the rehabilitation limb: first, whether the offender has accepted responsibility, acknowledged wrongfulness and expressed remorse; and second, whether the offender has taken steps to reform, including seeking counselling, refraining from further offending, and being a valuable member of the community.

The Court held that both aspects — remorse and reformation — must be demonstrated for full weight to be given to that limb. Less than full weight will be accorded where reliance is placed merely on abstinence from further offending.3

"Both aspects of rehabilitation — remorse and reformation — must be demonstrated, in order for the court to give full weight to that limb. Less than full weight will be accorded where reliance is placed merely on abstinence from further offending."

In the present case, the appellant had not expressed remorse and had not taken any steps towards rehabilitation during the period of delay. While there was evidence that he had not reoffended, the weight to be given to the delay had to be reduced accordingly.

The Sentencing Judge's Reasons

The Court acknowledged that it would have been preferable had the judge stated explicitly that the delay had informed the exercise of his sentencing discretion in only a limited way because he could not infer that the appellant was rehabilitated. However, the Court referred to Rodriguez v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth), where it was held that a sentencing judge need not make separate reference to each limb of delay when stating that delay has been treated as a mitigating factor.

The Court concluded that no question arose as to whether the rehabilitation limb had received any weight, because counsel on the plea had not identified the basis upon which rehabilitation should be inferred. The appellant had not accepted responsibility, was not remorseful, and had not taken any steps towards rehabilitation.

The Outcome — Sentences Within Range

The Court held that the individual sentences were within range. The Court stated that, had it not been for the delay, the circumstances of the offending were such as to justify individual sentences of five years for each sexual penetration offence and two years for each indecent act offence. Given that the judge imposed three years for each sexual penetration charge and 12 or 18 months for each indecent act charge, it could safely be inferred that the judge significantly discounted the sentences and ordered only modest cumulation due to the delay.4

"In our view, therefore, the judge not only took into account delay as a mitigating factor, as he said he did, but did so in a manner that was very generous to the appellant. This resulted in individual sentences, orders for cumulation and a total effective sentence which were well within the range of sentencing options available to the judge."

Significance and Precedent

Tones v The Queen is an important authority on the treatment of delay as a mitigating factor in sentencing. It establishes several key principles:

First, delay has two distinct limbs — unfairness and rehabilitation — and an offender seeking to rely on either limb must ordinarily adduce evidence to support it, unless there is a concession from the Crown.

Second, for the rehabilitation limb to attract full weight, both remorse and reformation must be demonstrated. Mere abstinence from further offending, without evidence of remorse or positive steps towards rehabilitation, will attract less weight.

Third, where a sentencing judge refers to delay generally without distinguishing between the two limbs, the question is whether the sentences imposed are manifestly excessive. If the individual sentences and total effective sentence are moderate and within range, it may be inferred that the judge gave appropriate weight to the delay.

Conclusion

The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the sentencing judge had taken delay into account as a mitigating factor and had done so generously, resulting in sentences that were well within the available range. The case illustrates that while delay can be a powerful mitigating factor, its weight depends on the evidence adduced to support each limb, and an offender who has not demonstrated remorse or taken steps towards rehabilitation cannot expect full weight to be given to the rehabilitation limb.


Footnotes

1 Tones v The Queen[2017] VSCA 118, [36].1

2 Tones v The Queen[2017] VSCA 118, [38].2

3 Tones v The Queen[2017] VSCA 118, [42].3

4 Tones v The Queen[2017] VSCA 118, [48].4

Footnotes

  1. 1 Tones v The Queen [2017] VSCA 118, [36].
  2. 2 Ibid [38].
  3. 3 Ibid [42].
  4. 4 Ibid [48].

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