In Victoria's Children's Court, children are sentenced under the Youth Justice Act 2024 rather than the adult regime: rehabilitation gets the highest priority, general deterrence does not apply, orders follow a hierarchy with minimum intervention, and detention is tightly restricted, especially for under-14s.
Sentencing a child in the Children's Court of Victoria is governed by a distinct statutory framework, not the adult sentencing regime, because the Sentencing Act 1991 applies to all courts except the Children's Court.1 The Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic) has its own sentencing principles and hierarchy of orders, rather than the adult sentencing framework of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic); the Youth Justice Act itself applies particular provisions of the Sentencing Act, such as ss 34 and 35 to detention orders.2 A sentence imposed on a child should give the highest priority to the child's rehabilitation and positive development.3 The common law principle of general deterrence does not apply to the sentencing of a child under the Youth Justice Act 2024.4 The Act also restricts detention: the Children's Court must not impose a sentence of detention on a child who was under 14 at the time of the offence except in the defined circumstances.5
General information about Victorian criminal law, not legal advice. Built from Bodkin's research answers and checked claim by claim against the judgments and the Acts in force on 8 November 2026.
Definition
Under the Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic), a child is a person under 18 years of age and, for a person who commits an offence, also a person who was under 18 at the time of the offence unless excluded by s 4(3).6 Under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), a young offender is an offender who is under 21 at the time of being sentenced.7
The sentencing options form a hierarchy: starting from dismissal without a formal warning, each further option is available only if the court is satisfied that the option before it is inappropriate in the circumstances, and a fine and a good behaviour order sit at the same level.8
The sentencing principles include that a sentence imposed on a child should protect the community from any further offending by the child,9 should provide opportunities for the child to restore any harm caused by their offending,10 and should be the minimum intervention required in the circumstances.11 A sentence should also ensure that the child is aware that they must bear a responsibility for any action they take which is against the law.12 A sentence should be tailored to the individual characteristics of the child and should recognise the vulnerabilities and strengths of the child.13 Section 210 adds further sentencing principles for Aboriginal children, in addition to the other sentencing principles.14 A court is not to take into account the guiding youth justice principles in Part 1.3 when sentencing a child.15
The Children's Court may take into account any submission under s 221 on the unique systemic and background factors affecting the child.16 A child found guilty may request that the Court hear from, or receive written submissions from, people the child calls on those factors.17
A conviction must not be recorded when the Children's Court dismisses a charge with or without a formal warning, makes a good behaviour order, or imposes a fine.18 A community service order can be made only if the child is 15 or over on the day of sentencing, the child consents, and the court is satisfied suitable programs are available.19
The Children's Court must not make a youth justice custodial order unless it is satisfied that the circumstances and nature of the offence are sufficiently serious to warrant the order and that no other sentence is appropriate.20 Before a youth justice custodial order is made, the court must have taken into account any pre-sentence report, any previous pre-sentence report and any supplementary pre-sentence report (if applicable), any pre-sentence group conference report, and any previous contravention report.21 The Court must not impose a sentence of detention on a child who was under 14 at the time of the offence unless the offence is a Category A serious youth offence, a Category B serious youth offence, or any other offence against a person that the Court considers to be serious and violent, and the Court is reasonably satisfied that the child presents a serious risk to community safety.22 A youth justice custodial order for a child under 15 on the day of sentencing must not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence if committed by an adult and in any event must not exceed one year.23 A youth justice custodial order for a child 15 or over but under 21 on the day of sentencing must not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the offence if committed by an adult and in any event must not exceed three years.24 The most the Children's Court may order a child to pay under Part 4 of the Sentencing Act 1991 is $1000.25
Source
The Children's Court of Victoria is a statutory court: s 504(1) of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) provides that there continues to be a court called the Children's Court of Victoria.26 Under s 504(2), the Court consists of a President, the magistrates, the judicial registrars and the registrars of the Court.27 Its existence and constitution come from ss 504 to 510 of that Act, and the Criminal Division's jurisdiction to hear and determine charges against children is conferred by s 516.28
The Criminal Division has jurisdiction to hear and determine all charges against children for summary offences and, subject to Division 1 of Part 6.1 of the Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic), to hear and determine summarily charges against children for indictable offences other than murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, child homicide, homicide by firearm and the other offences listed in s 516(1)(b).29
The Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply in the Children's Court: s 4 provides that the Act applies to all courts except the Children's Court.30
The sentencing principles for children are in Part 7.1 of the Youth Justice Act 2024 (ss 202 to 210), and the closed list of materials the Children's Court may consider is in s 211, in Part 7.2.31 Section 202(1)(b) requires a court, as far as is reasonably practicable and appropriate, to have regard to the general common law principles or rules applicable to the sentencing of children, subject to subsections (2) and (3).32 The common law principles therefore remain relevant only subject to s 202(2) and (3).33
In sentencing a child for an indictable offence, the Supreme Court or County Court may impose any sentence the Children's Court may impose under the Youth Justice Act 2024, but an order that the child be detained in a youth justice custodial centre must be made in accordance with Subdivision (4) of Division 2 of Part 3 of the Sentencing Act 1991.34 When the Supreme Court or County Court sentences a child aged 16 or 17 at the time of an indictable offence, it is to have regard to any requirement in the Sentencing Act 1991 for a specified minimum non-parole period that would apply had the offence been committed by an adult.35 Section 5(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 lists deterring the offender or other persons from committing offences of the same or a similar character as a purpose for which a sentence may be imposed.36
In DPP v SL [2016] VSC 714, decided under the predecessor regime, the Supreme Court explained that a child sentenced in a higher court is dealt with under a different statutory framework from a child sentenced in the Children's Court.37 Under the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), the Supreme Court noted that the CYF Act regime differed from the Sentencing Act in recognition of the different considerations relevant to a child offender compared with an adult offender.38
How it is applied and weighed
Youth is a mitigating factor, but it is not absolute: the particular weight it carries depends on the circumstances of the case, and as the level of seriousness of criminality increases there is a corresponding reduction in its mitigating effect.39 In Cairns (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 333, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that, in sentencing a youthful offender, generally speaking, the greater the seriousness of the crime, the more the mitigating influence of youth is diminished, although not completely eliminated.40
In HA (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 64, an appeal about bail for a child, the Court of Appeal said that, in considering whether to grant bail and in the sentencing process, courts are astute to avoid imposing a term of detention on a child unless there is no other reasonable disposition available.41
Under the former Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), the matters a court had to have regard to in sentencing a child were, without exception, directed at the effect of the proposed sentence on the child.42 Under that Act, general deterrence was not a relevant sentencing purpose in sentencing a child, whereas rehabilitation was usually the principal focus.43 The Court of Appeal held that the statutory language of that Act excluded general deterrence from the sentencing of a child.44 In Anderson, as set out in Cairns (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 333, the Court of Appeal said that once the sentencing judge had concluded that sentencing dispositions under the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 were inadequate and that a sentence of adult custody was necessary, the provisions of that Act had no application and general deterrence was applicable.45
Under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), which expressly includes general deterrence among the purposes for which sentence may be imposed, general deterrence is not excluded altogether for a young offender, but it is a rare case in which a judge is permitted to materially increase a sentence by dint of general deterrence.46 In Eade v R the Court of Appeal accepted the Director's concession and held that the emphasis placed on general deterrence had been erroneous.47
In Balshaw v The Queen [2021] VSCA 78, the Court of Appeal held that the judge erred in considering that a custodial sentence of no more than four years was not sufficient, so that imprisonment in an adult jail was necessary (at paragraph 63); the Court allowed the appeal and resentenced the appellant to detention in a Youth Justice Centre (at paragraph 66).48 The Court applied the principle that a youthful offender is not to be sent to an adult prison if such a disposition can be avoided.49 The appellant was 20 at sentence, so the case concerned a young adult sentenced under the Sentencing Act 1991, not a child.50
In Cairns, once the sentencing judge resolved to impose a sentence of imprisonment of more than three years on the culpable driving charge, it would have been somewhat impractical to sentence the applicant to be detained in a youth justice centre on any of the other charges.51
The adult framework is different: under s 5(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 the purposes for which sentence may be imposed include general deterrence,52 and adult cases have emphasised general deterrence in fraud matters and described it as the most important sentencing consideration in a child abuse material case.5354
Leading authorities
In Pamic v The King [2026] VSCA 173, the Court of Appeal held that an adult being sentenced in Victoria must be sentenced under the Sentencing Act 1991.55 In Rootsey, as set out in Pamic, the Court said that general deterrence continues to have relevance to the sentencing of adults for offences committed as children, and that the sentencing judge was correct to reduce the influence of general deterrence without altogether excluding it as a sentencing factor.56 In DPP v Browne [2026] VCC 1335, the County Court adopted the principles distilled in Pamic, including that deterrence does not play the same role in the sentencing of young offenders and that it is illogical and unfair to lose sight of that when sentencing an adult for an offence committed as a child.57
In C N K v The Queen the Court of Appeal held emphatically that general deterrence had no place in the sentencing of children in the Children's Court.58 It reasoned that the language of s 362(1) of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), and the nature of the matters to which regard must be had, were such as to preclude any consideration of general deterrence.59 Section 202(3) of the Youth Justice Act 2024 now provides that the common law principle of general deterrence does not apply to the sentencing of a child under that Act.60
In R v AC [2015] VSC 323, the court reproduced the considerations in s 362(1) of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic).61 In Fuller v The Queen [2013] VSCA 186, Ashley JA recorded that s 362(1) refers to matters to which the Children's Court is to have regard, but that it has been held that in some circumstances provisions of that Act relating to sentences are to be applied when an offender is sentenced in a superior court.62 In Cairns the Court of Appeal observed that the County Court is not "the Court" as contemplated by s 362.63
In DPP v MJ the Supreme Court said the former Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 set out a sentencing regime specifically applicable to children, with 11 sentencing options in s 360 arranged as a hierarchy from dismissal without conviction to detention in a youth justice centre; Part 5.3, which contained s 360, has since been repealed by the Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic).6465
Recent changes
Part 5.3 of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), which contained ss 360 and 362, has been repealed by the Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic).66
Under s 2(3) of the Youth Justice Act 2024, a remaining provision that had not come into operation before 30 September 2026 comes into operation on that day.67
The opportunity to be sentenced as a child ends if a person is 19 or over when proceedings for the offence are commenced, even if they were under 18 when the offence was committed; the Sentencing Act 1991 then applies.68
In CDPP v XY (a pseudonym) [2025] VSC 661, the Supreme Court described how sentencing of children in the Children's Court was conducted under the CYFA, under which s 360 listed the available sentences and s 362 identified matters to be taken into account.69
Footnotes
- 1 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 4.
- 2 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 327.
- 3 Ibid s 203.
- 4 Ibid s 202(3).
- 5 Ibid s 324.
- 6 Ibid s 4.
- 7 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 3(1).
- 8 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 240.
- 9 Ibid s 204.
- 10 Ibid s 207.
- 11 Ibid s 208.
- 12 Ibid s 206.
- 13 Ibid s 205.
- 14 Ibid s 210.
- 15 Ibid s 202.
- 16 Ibid s 211.
- 17 Ibid s 221.
- 18 Ibid s 242.
- 19 Ibid s 263(2).
- 20 Ibid s 325(2)(c).
- 21 Ibid s 325.
- 22 Ibid s 324.
- 23 Ibid s 327(2)(a).
- 24 Ibid s 327(2)(b).
- 25 Ibid s 329(2).
- 26 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 504.
- 27 Ibid s 504.
- 28 Ibid s 516.
- 29 Ibid s 516.
- 30 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 4.
- 31 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 202.
- 32 Ibid s 202.
- 33 Ibid s 202.
- 34 Ibid s 241.
- 35 Ibid s 241.
- 36 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(b).
- 37 DPP v SL [2016] VSC 714, [2].
- 38 DPP v WA [2022] VSC 506, [17].
- 39 Balshaw v The Queen [2021] VSCA 78, [56].
- 40 Cairns (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 333, [42].
- 41 HA (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 64, [55].
- 42 Poutai v The Queen [2011] VSCA 382, [24].
- 43 R v AC [2015] VSC 323, [35].
- 44 Cairns (n 40) [29].
- 45 Ibid [34].
- 46 Eade v The Queen [2012] VSCA 142, [42].
- 47 Ibid [44].
- 48 Balshaw (n 39) [66].
- 49 Ibid [55].
- 50 Ibid [21].
- 51 Cairns (n 40) [36].
- 52 R v Murray [2018] VSC 133, [48].
- 53 R v Gant [2016] VSC 662, [132].
- 54 CDPP v Radings [2021] VCC 108, [69].
- 55 Pamic v The King [2026] VSCA 173, [45].
- 56 Ibid [44].
- 57 DPP v Browne [2026] VCC 1335, [103].
- 58 Pamic (n 55) [32].
- 59 Ibid [32].
- 60 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 202(3).
- 61 AC (n 43) [36].
- 62 Fuller v The Queen [2013] VSCA 186, [33].
- 63 Cairns (n 40) [37].
- 64 DPP v MJ [2026] VSC 90, [22].
- 65 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic).
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 2(3).
- 68 Pamic (n 55) [38].
- 69 CDPP v XY (a pseudonym) [2025] VSC 661, [16].