General deterrence, which aims to discourage other people from offending, is excluded when a child is sentenced under the Youth Justice Act 2024, but still counts, in a reduced way, when an adult is sentenced for an offence committed as a child.
General deterrence is the sentencing purpose of deterring other people from committing offences of the same or a similar character, and it is one of the purposes for which a sentence may be imposed under s 5(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991.1 For children in Victoria it is excluded: s 202(3) of the Youth Justice Act 2024 provides that "The common law principle of general deterrence does not apply to the sentencing of a child under this Act".23 The exclusion matters because it separates the sentencing of children from the sentencing of adults, for whom Parliament has determined that general deterrence and denunciation may be taken into account.4 It also marks a boundary: an adult sentenced for an offence committed as a child is sentenced under the Sentencing Act 1991, where general deterrence remains relevant but is reduced to reflect immaturity.56 Within the child regime, s 205 provides that a sentence imposed on a child should "be tailored to the individual characteristics of the child".7
General information about Victorian criminal law, not legal advice. Built from Bodkin's research answers and checked claim by claim against the judgments and the Acts in force on 9 November 2026.
The rule
Under s 4, a child means a person who is under 18 years of age, and a person who was under 18 when an offence was committed counts as a child for that offence unless excluded by s 4(3), including because they were 19 or over at the time of the commencement of the proceeding for the offence.8
Section 205 provides that a sentence imposed on a child should "be tailored to the individual characteristics of the child, such as the following", which include age, maturity and stage of development, Aboriginal identity, disability and associated support needs, and mental health and other health needs, among other characteristics.9 It should recognise the vulnerabilities and strengths of the child, having regard to relevant experiences including abuse, trauma, neglect, loss, family violence or child protection involvement.10
Under the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005, s 362(1) set out the matters to be taken into account in sentencing a child, and that Part has been repealed.11 In C N K v The Queen the Court of Appeal held that the language of s 362(1), and the nature of the matters to which regard had to be had, precluded any consideration of general deterrence.12 In Rootsey v The Queen, decided before the Youth Justice Act 2024, the Court of Appeal said that because of the operative legislative regime, general deterrence is excluded from consideration in the sentencing of children.13 In H v Rowe the court said that "The principle of specific deterrence is incorporated within s 362(1)(g) of the Act; general deterrence is not a relevant sentencing principle".14
In Pamic v The King the Court of Appeal set out the passage in Rootsey that, because of the operative legislative regime, general deterrence is excluded from consideration in the sentencing of children, while it continues to have relevance to the sentencing of adults for offences committed as children.15
How courts apply it
In Eade v R two young offenders were sentenced under the Sentencing Act 1991, which includes deterrence among the purposes for which a sentence may be imposed.16 The Court of Appeal accepted the Director's submission that general deterrence is not excluded altogether, but that "of critical importance is the relative weight to be attached to the sentencing purpose of general deterrence", and that it is a rare case in which a judge is permitted to materially increase the sentence imposed on a young offender by dint of general deterrence.17 The Director conceded that neither appellant was an "appropriate vehicle" for general deterrence (Eade v The Queen [2012] VSCA 142 [43]), and the Court held that the Director was right to concede that the emphasis placed on general deterrence was erroneous (Eade v The Queen [2012] VSCA 142 [44]).18 In relation to Mr Eade, the Director conceded that it would be inhumane of the criminal justice system to put the young man "up on a sentencing pedestal" and impose a sentence designed to send a salutary message to other would-be offenders.19
Youth should be a primary consideration where that matter properly arises, and in the case of a youthful offender rehabilitation is usually far more important than general deterrence, because punishment may in fact lead to further offending.2021 The weight given to youth depends on the circumstances, and as the level of seriousness of criminality increases there is a corresponding reduction in the mitigating effect of youth.22 In Balshaw, which concerned an appellant aged 20 at sentence,23 the Court of Appeal said that where the offence is one commonly committed by young offenders, the youth of the offender may need to be accorded less weight as a mitigating factor, in order to ensure that the sentencing principles of general deterrence and specific deterrence be given sufficient weight.24
In Pamic v The King the Court of Appeal distilled the approach to sentencing an adult for an offence committed as a child: the penalty is moderated to reflect a diminution in the child's moral culpability and in the nature and gravity of the offending as a consequence of immaturity, and deterrence does not play the same role in the sentencing of young offenders.25 The Court recorded the appellant's submission that any weight given to general deterrence must be significantly reduced because the offending was committed as a child, and observed that this was broadly consistent with the current line of authority in Sherritt, Rootsey and PJB.26 Where rehabilitation has been effected over a long period of blemish-free life in the community, deterrence and denunciation may fade or even disappear, at the discretion of the sentencing judge.27
In RAC v R the applicant argued that the sentencing judge had erred by taking general deterrence into account when applying s 362(1).28 The Court of Appeal recorded that the matters in s 362(1) were such as to preclude any consideration of general deterrence in relation to youthful offenders (RAC v The Queen [2011] VSCA 294 [9]), and the respondent conceded that the decision in C N K was applicable (RAC v The Queen [2011] VSCA 294 [10]).29 In DPP v Hunt (a pseudonym) the County Court set out the Court of Appeal's statement in Rootsey that the sentencing judge there was correct to "reduce the influence which the concept of general deterrence should be accorded", without altogether excluding it as a sentencing factor.30 In Fuller the Court of Appeal found that, because of the offender's age at the time of offending, his intellectual and psychological disability and his injuries, general deterrence could not be regarded as a factor of any significance, while leaving open whether s 362(1) applied in a superior court.31 In As v R the Court recorded that it was correctly submitted, and conceded by the respondent, that the principle of general deterrence is excluded from consideration in sentencing a child.32 In DPP v Abien the County Court quoted President Maxwell in R v Wyey to the effect that there is a role for general deterrence in relation to every class of case, though its role will vary with the circumstances of the case.33
Limits and exceptions
Section 202(1) requires a court sentencing a child, as far as is reasonably practicable and appropriate, to have regard to the sentencing principles and, subject to subsections (2) and (3), the general common law principles applicable to the sentencing of children.3435 Under s 202(2), "the sentencing principles take precedence to the extent of the inconsistency".36 Section 202(3) removes only the common law principle of general deterrence; the other general common law principles applicable to the sentencing of children must still be had regard to, subject to subsections (2) and (3).37
It does not reach a person who committed the offence as a child but is excluded from the meaning of "child" because they were 19 or over when the proceeding began.38 The opportunity to be sentenced as a child expires if a person is 19 or over at the time when proceedings for the offence are commenced, even if they were under 18 when the offence was committed.39 Eade v R concerned two young offenders sentenced under the Sentencing Act 1991, one of whom, Mr Eade, was aged 19.40
Under s 241 of the Youth Justice Act 2024, the powers the Supreme Court or the County Court may exercise in sentencing a child for an indictable offence include the power to impose any sentence the Children's Court may impose under that Act, but an order that the child be detained in a youth justice custodial centre must be made in accordance with Subdivision (4) of Division 2 of Part 3 of the Sentencing Act 1991.41 Under s 32(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991, subject to subsections (2C), (2D) and (2E), if a sentence involving confinement is justified in respect of a young offender, a court may make a youth justice custodial order if it has received a pre-sentence report and believes either that there are reasonable prospects for the rehabilitation of the young offender or that the young offender is particularly impressionable, immature or likely to be subjected to undesirable influences in an adult prison, and it has had regard to the matters in s 32(2).42 A young offender is an offender who at the time of being sentenced is under the age of 21 years.43 The current maximum period of youth justice centre detention in the County Court or Supreme Court is 4 years.44 A youth justice centre is punitive, but its focus is on the development and rehabilitation of its detainees.45
In DPP v MG (a pseudonym), a County Court decision applying the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005, the court said that once it concluded that the relevant sentencing considerations could only be met by a custodial sentence, including youth detention, the s 5(1) considerations of the Sentencing Act 1991 applied, including general deterrence.46 In DPP v Carter the sentencing judge considered that a sentence exceeding the then three-year maximum term of detention for a Youth Justice Order was necessary because of the seriousness of the offence and the offender's culpability (DPP v Carter (pseudonym) [2016] VCC 1173 [47]), and accepted that youth and prospects of rehabilitation meant specific deterrence required less emphasis but was not eliminated, and that general deterrence remained important (DPP v Carter (pseudonym) [2016] VCC 1173 [48]).47 The judge said that "There are cases where the allowance for youth must give way to other considerations".48 In Bower v R the Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that the sentence was well open because of the seriousness of the offence, the applicant's history, and guarded prospects of rehabilitation.49
Footnotes
- 1 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5.
- 2 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 202.
- 3 Ibid s 202(3).
- 4 Pamic v The King [2026] VSCA 173, [50].
- 5 Ibid [44].
- 6 Ibid [45].
- 7 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 205.
- 8 Ibid s 4(3).
- 9 Ibid s 205.
- 10 Ibid s 205.
- 11 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic).
- 12 Pamic (n 4) [32].
- 13 Rootsey v The Queen [2018] VSCA 108, [14].
- 14 H v Rowe [2008] VSC 369, [12].
- 15 Pamic (n 4) [44].
- 16 Eade v The Queen [2012] VSCA 142, [42].
- 17 Ibid [42].
- 18 Ibid [43].
- 19 Ibid [43].
- 20 Balshaw v The Queen [2021] VSCA 78, [55].
- 21 Ibid [55].
- 22 Ibid [56].
- 23 Ibid [21].
- 24 Ibid [56].
- 25 Pamic (n 4) [45].
- 26 Ibid [25].
- 27 Ibid [45].
- 28 RAC v The Queen [2011] VSCA 294, [6].
- 29 Ibid [10].
- 30 DPP v Hunt (a pseudonym) [2023] VCC 1033, [33].
- 31 Fuller v The Queen [2013] VSCA 186, [35].
- 32 As v The Queen [2019] VSC 260, [58].
- 33 DPP v Abien [2017] VCC 1532, [84].
- 34 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 202.
- 35 Ibid s 202.
- 36 Ibid s 202.
- 37 Ibid s 202.
- 38 Ibid s 4.
- 39 Pamic (n 4) [38].
- 40 Eade (n 16) [45].
- 41 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 241.
- 42 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 32.
- 43 Ibid s 3.
- 44 Ibid s 32.
- 45 Moresco v The Queen [2018] VSCA 336, [51].
- 46 DPP v MG (a pseudonym) [2026] VCC 1495, [125].
- 47 DPP v Carter (pseudonym) [2016] VCC 1173, [47].
- 48 Ibid [49].
- 49 Bower v The King [2024] VSCA 317.