General deterrence

Bodkin·5 Nov 2026

What general deterrence means in Victorian sentencing, where it comes from in the Sentencing Act 1991, when courts give it more or less weight (including for young offenders and offenders with a mental impairment), and how the law has changed.

General deterrence is one of the purposes for which a Victorian court may impose a sentence. It is directed at others: it is the purpose of deterring other people, not only the offender, from committing the same or similar offences.1 The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) states the purpose as deterring the offender or other persons from committing offences of the same or a similar character,2 and the courts label the deterring of others "general deterrence" and the deterring of the offender "specific deterrence".3 The purpose matters because it is one of the only purposes for which sentences may be imposed.4 Its weight is not fixed. General deterrence assumes greater importance when the crime is serious, has been committed in a particularly grave form, and its contemporary prevalence is the cause of considerable community disquiet.5 It is given special emphasis in some categories of offending, including white collar crime, family violence and child abuse material.678 Its weight may be moderated or eliminated where an offender has impaired mental functioning.9 It is excluded altogether in the sentencing of children under the Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic).10 Where an adult is sentenced for an offence committed as a child, its weight is reduced but it is not excluded.11

General information about Victorian criminal law, not legal advice. Built from Bodkin's research answers and checked claim by claim against the judgments and the Acts in force on 5 November 2026.

Definition

The Act states the deterrence purpose as deterring the offender or other persons from committing offences of the same or a similar character,12 and the courts label deterring others "general deterrence" and deterring the offender "specific deterrence".13

The purposes of sentencing under s 5(1) are commonly listed in shorthand as general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation, protection of the community, just punishment and rehabilitation.1415 The distinction between the two forms of deterrence is drawn expressly: general deterrence is to deter others from behaving as the offender did, and specific deterrence is to deter the offender from ever repeating such offending.1617

The purposes of sentencing, including the two forms of deterrence, are not applied mechanically.18 In 2026 the Court of Appeal described Victoria's approach to weighing sentencing purposes as the Victorian instinctive synthesis approach.19

Source

General deterrence is a statutory sentencing purpose in Victoria: s 5(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provides that one of the only purposes for which a sentence may be imposed is "to deter the offender or other persons from committing offences of the same or a similar character".20 Section 5(1) provides that the only purposes for which sentences may be imposed are to punish the offender to an extent and in a manner which is just in all of the circumstances, to deter the offender or other persons from committing offences of the same or a similar character, to establish conditions within which it is considered by the court that the rehabilitation of the offender may be facilitated, to manifest the denunciation by the court of the type of conduct in which the offender engaged, to protect the community from the offender, or a combination of two or more of those purposes.21 The basic purposes for which a court may impose a sentence are punishment, general deterrence and specific deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation and protection of the community.22

The companion obligation is in s 5(2), which requires a court, in sentencing an offender, to have regard to a list of matters.23 That list includes the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence.24 The current s 5(2)(g) refers to any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the offender or any other relevant circumstances, and s 5(2)(ab) adds the standard sentence, if any, for the offence.25

In some settings the Act directs that general deterrence be given greater importance than the other purposes, for example in deciding whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances under s 5(2H)(e) for a category 2 offence.26 In determining whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances under s 5(2H)(e), s 5(2HC)(a) requires the court to regard general deterrence and denunciation of the offender's conduct as having greater importance than the other purposes set out in section 5(1).27 Section 10A(2B) gives the same direction when, under s 10A(2)(e), a court decides whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances that justify a finding that a special reason exists for the purposes of ss 9B, 9C, 10, 10AA, 10AB, 10AC, 10AD or 10AE.28

For a federal offence, s 16A(2)(ja) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) requires a court to take into account, so far as relevant and known to it, the deterrent effect that any sentence or order under consideration may have on other persons.29

Under s 202(1) of the Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic) a court sentencing a child must, as far as is reasonably practicable and appropriate in the circumstances, have regard to the sentencing principles to the extent each is relevant and, subject to s 202(2) and (3), to the general common law principles or rules applicable to the sentencing of children.30 Under s 202(2), if the sentencing principles and those common law principles or rules are inconsistent, the sentencing principles take precedence to the extent of the inconsistency.31 Section 202(3) provides that the common law principle of general deterrence does not apply to the sentencing of a child under that Act.32 The Supreme Court or County Court sentencing a child for an indictable offence may impose any sentence the Children's Court may impose under the Youth Justice Act 2024, but an order detaining the child in a youth justice custodial centre must be made under the Sentencing Act 1991.33 Under the Sentencing Act 1991 a young offender is an offender who, at the time of being sentenced, is under 21 years of age.34

How it is applied and weighed

General deterrence is given greater importance when the offence is serious, has been committed in a particularly grave form, and its contemporary prevalence is the cause of considerable community disquiet.35 Its importance is not absolute: it is affected by the circumstances attending the commission of the crime and factors personal to the offender.36

Where the offence is one of serious violence, general deterrence is treated as especially relevant.37 General deterrence looms large in a case such as an unprovoked, gratuitous attack on a helpless victim, continuing after he was unconscious.38 In sentencing for culpable driving causing death, the County Court has said that in cases such as the one before it, the application of the principle of general deterrence will be a very important factor.39

General deterrence is a paramount sentencing consideration in offences under the coercive powers regime.40 In a contempt case, the purposes of general deterrence, specific deterrence and denunciation required a substantial sentence for a deliberate refusal to be sworn before the Chief Examiner.41 The particularly significant purposes for which sentences may be imposed for contempt of court are to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences of the same or a similar character and to manifest the Court's denunciation of the conduct.42 The considerations relevant to penalty for contempt include the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice and general and specific deterrence.43 The Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply to the imposition of penalty for a contempt of court, though sentencing principles should be taken into account where relevant.44 In R v Murray, a sentence for contempt of the Chief Examiner, the judge treated the s 5 sentencing guidelines as applying to sentences imposed for contempt, a different view from R v Witt (No 2), where it was accepted that the Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply to the imposition of penalty for a contempt of court.4546

In white collar and revenue offences, general deterrence is given special emphasis.47 The courts have consistently emphasised that general deterrence is a particularly significant sentencing consideration in white collar crime.48 The deterrent and punitive effects of a sentence for serious tax fraud must be reflected in both the head sentence and any provision for earlier release from custody.49 In cases such as the present, an unduly short non-parole period would be quite subversive of the whole concept of general deterrence.50

In cases involving child abuse material, general deterrence is the most important sentencing consideration.51 In cases of using a carriage service to procure a person under 16 for sexual activity, paramount consideration must be given to the principle of general deterrence, and a sentencing judge may give less weight to prior good character.52

In family violence offending, general deterrence and denunciation are called for, particularly where an offender defies an intervention order.53 An attempt by a perpetrator of family violence to prevent a victim from seeking the full protection of the law and their physical and emotional safety is a very serious matter which calls for general deterrence and denunciation.54 In all the circumstances of that case, horrific violence against a woman at the hands of her domestic partner in their own home, in the context of persistent defiance of a family violence intervention order, called for denunciation, just punishment and general deterrence.55 General deterrence assumes significance in sentencing for family violence offences, including the most extreme examples of such offences.56 The offender's extreme childhood deprivation, together with a mental impairment causally connected to the offending, moderated general deterrence as a sentencing consideration.57 The Court of Appeal bears in mind the fundamental importance of general deterrence in sentencing for family violence offending, including extreme family violence offending resulting in the death of a former intimate partner.58 Where the Director argued that inadequate weight had been given to general and specific deterrence, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the sentence was lenient but dismissed the appeal, finding it was not wholly outside the available range.59

For an offender with impaired mental functioning, whether general deterrence is moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited by the offender and the effect of the condition on the offender's mental capacity, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of sentence or both.60 General deterrence "is not eliminated but still operates, sensibly moderated, in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or severe intellectual handicap".61 Whether a psychiatric condition should reduce or eliminate general deterrence as an appropriate purpose of punishment depends upon the nature and severity of its symptoms and its effect upon the mental capacity of the accused.62 The reason less weight might be given to general deterrence where an offender suffers from a mental disorder or abnormality lies in the inappropriateness to the purpose of general deterrence.63 The community will readily understand that an offender who suffers from a mental disorder or abnormality is less in control of his or her cognitive facilities or emotional restraints, and in some instances lacks the ability to make reasoned or ordered judgments.64 Where an offender suffers from an impulse control disorder in the form of pathological gambling, the relevance of the disorder to sentence is assessed in accordance with the principles restated in Verdins.65 In sentencing a young man with schizophrenia, the County Court reduced the weight given to general deterrence, and to specific deterrence, in light of the offender's condition.66 It would be an unusual case where evidence of addiction to gambling would have any significant effect upon the importance of the element of general deterrence.67

For young offenders sentenced in the higher courts under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), general deterrence is not viewed as excluded altogether.68 It is a rare case in which a judge is permitted to materially increase the sentence imposed on a young offender by dint of general deterrence.69 What is of critical importance is the relative weight to be attached to the sentencing purpose of general deterrence.70 In the case of a youthful offender, rehabilitation is usually far more important than general deterrence, a proposition the Court of Appeal accepted in R v Mills.71 In 2012, where a 17-year-old who was a 'child' under the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 was sentenced for manslaughter under the Sentencing Act, general deterrence and denunciation were available as purposes, but the conduct embodied the youthful impulsivity and lack of foresight behind the logic of not using children as vehicles of denunciation and general deterrence.72 Where the sentencing judge held that general deterrence was "a significant sentencing consideration" despite the apparent youth of the offenders, the Court of Appeal agreed that the emphasis placed on general deterrence was erroneous.7374 The judge erred to the extent of allowing deterrence to outrank rehabilitation as the dominant sentencing purpose.75 It would be inhumane to put a young man "up on a sentencing pedestal" to send a message to others.76 In Fuller (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2013] VSCA 186, as Cairns describes it, Ashley JA said that, by reason of the appellant's age at the time of offending (14 years and 10 months), his level of intellectual and psychological disability and the injuries he sustained, general deterrence cannot be regarded as a factor of any significance in the sentencing synthesis.77

In Victoria, because of the operative legislative regime, general deterrence is excluded from consideration in the sentencing of children.78 Before the Youth Justice Act 2024, s 362 of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) set out matters to be taken into account in sentencing a child, and the Court of Appeal held that, on the proper construction of that Act, general deterrence was excluded from consideration in the sentencing of children.79 Before the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), general deterrence was a relevant sentencing factor in the sentencing of children.80

Where an adult is sentenced for an offence committed as a child, the weight given to deterrence, including general deterrence, is reduced to reflect the offender's immaturity at the time of the offence, although general deterrence continues to have relevance.81 In Rootsey, as set out in Pamic v The King [2026] VSCA 173 at [44], the Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge was correct to "reduce the influence which the concept of general deterrence should be accorded", without altogether excluding it as a sentencing factor.82 The approach in Victoria is to moderate appropriately the penalty imposed on an adult guilty of a childhood offence to reflect a diminution in the child's moral culpability and the nature and gravity of the offending as a consequence of the child's immaturity.83 Where rehabilitation has been effected over a long period of blemish-free life in the community, the principles of rehabilitation assume greater weight and consideration of deterrence and denunciation may fade or even disappear, but that is at the discretion of the sentencing judge.84 In a sentence for offences committed as a child, general deterrence was moderated but far from eliminated, and continued to have a role to play in the sentencing considerations, alongside public denunciation.85 The Court of Appeal refused to alter the Victorian approach to sentencing adults for childhood offences, finding no compelling reason to depart from it.86

For historical sexual offences, general deterrence and denunciation remain very important sentencing objectives even though the offending took place long ago.87 Where an offender has continued to offend against children over many years, the sentencing judge is bound to give considerable weight to general and specific deterrence.88 A substantial total effective sentence was required to take account of the gravity of the offending, its effects on the victims, and the weight to be given to general and specific deterrence.89

The principles of general deterrence are not confined to the criminal courts: in civil disciplinary proceedings, some of the considerations applied in criminal sentencing are relevant.90

Recent changes

The sentencing provisions of the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) (Chapter 5, Part 5.3, which included s 362) have been repealed by the Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic).91 Part 5.3 held the sentencing provisions that C N K v The Queen applied, so C N K's reasoning on s 362(1) is history, and the current exclusion of general deterrence for children is s 202(3) of the Youth Justice Act.92 In DPP v Anderson [2013] VSCA 45, a young offender who needed an adult custodial sentence was sentenced outside the Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (as it then stood), and the Court of Appeal accepted as correct that general deterrence was then applicable.93 Where a person is sentenced under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), general deterrence is expressly identified by s 5(1)(b) as a purpose for which sentence may be imposed.94 In DPP v Browne [2026] VCC 1335 the County Court set out the principles distilled by the Court of Appeal in Pamic v The King [2026] VSCA 173 and adopted that approach.95 In [2025] VSCA 143, the applicant was sentenced for offences committed when he was 15 to 17 years old and sought leave to appeal on the ground that the sentencing judge erred in applying adult sentencing principles to offences committed as a child; the Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no error.96

Footnotes

  1. 1 R v Murray [2018] VSC 133, [48].
  2. 2 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(b).
  3. 3 Murray (n 1) [48].
  4. 4 Ibid [17].
  5. 5 R v McKee [2003] VSCA 16, [10].
  6. 6 DPP (Cth) v Gregory [2011] VSCA 145, [53].
  7. 7 DPP v Pualic [2025] VSCA 178, [94].
  8. 8 CDPP v Radings [2021] VCC 108, [69].
  9. 9 Charles v The Queen [2011] VSCA 399, [144].
  10. 10 Youth Justice Act 2024 (Vic) s 202(3).
  11. 11 Pamic v The King [2026] VSCA 173, [45].
  12. 12 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(b).
  13. 13 Murray (n 1) [48].
  14. 14 R v QF [2014] VSC 81, [30].
  15. 15 R v Gant [2016] VSC 662, [131].
  16. 16 DPP v Collier (a pseudonym) [2024] VCC 2147, [52].
  17. 17 DPP v Coppolino [2024] VCC 155, [48].
  18. 18 Inc v Voss [2002] VSC 319, [66].
  19. 19 Pamic (n 11) [48].
  20. 20 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(b).
  21. 21 Murray (n 1) [17].
  22. 22 DPP v Bahouche [2023] VCC 2267, [45].
  23. 23 Murray (n 1) [17].
  24. 24 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(a).
  25. 25 Ibid s 5(2).
  26. 26 Ibid s 5(2HC).
  27. 27 Ibid s 5(2HC)(a).
  28. 28 Ibid s 10A(2B).
  29. 29 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2).
  30. 30 Youth Justice Act 2024 s 202(1).
  31. 31 Ibid s 202.
  32. 32 Ibid s 202(3).
  33. 33 Ibid s 241(1).
  34. 34 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 3(1).
  35. 35 McKee (n 5) [10].
  36. 36 Ibid [10].
  37. 37 DPP v Weatherburn [2022] VCC 1440, [172].
  38. 38 Weatherburn v The King [2023] VSCA 283, [60].
  39. 39 DPP v Stafford-Duffy [2013] VCC 815, [46].
  40. 40 QF (n 14) [31].
  41. 41 Murray (n 1) [53].
  42. 42 DPP v Johnson [2002] VSC 583, [58].
  43. 43 R v Witt (No 2) [2016] VSC 142, [93].
  44. 44 Ibid [92].
  45. 45 Murray (n 1) [17].
  46. 46 Witt (No 2) (n 43) [92].
  47. 47 Gregory (n 6) [53].
  48. 48 Ibid [53].
  49. 49 Ibid [66].
  50. 50 Ibid [66].
  51. 51 CDPP (n 8) [69].
  52. 52 DPP v D'Costa [2012] VCC 554, [46].
  53. 53 Baker (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 158, [37].
  54. 54 Ibid [37].
  55. 55 Ibid [32].
  56. 56 Pualic (n 7) [94].
  57. 57 Ibid [94].
  58. 58 Ibid [82].
  59. 59 Ibid [102].
  60. 60 Charles (n 9) [144].
  61. 61 Ibid [146].
  62. 62 Ibid [147].
  63. 63 Ibid [148].
  64. 64 Ibid [148].
  65. 65 R v Grossi [2008] VSCA 51, [56].
  66. 66 DPP v Asmar [2020] VCC 1433, [37].
  67. 67 Grossi (n 65) [52].
  68. 68 Eade v The Queen [2012] VSCA 142, [42].
  69. 69 Ibid [42].
  70. 70 Ibid [42].
  71. 71 JPR v The Queen [2012] VSCA 50, [45].
  72. 72 Ibid [49].
  73. 73 Eade (n 68) [40].
  74. 74 Ibid [44].
  75. 75 Ibid [41].
  76. 76 Ibid [43].
  77. 77 Cairns (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 333, [35].
  78. 78 Pamic (n 11) [44].
  79. 79 Cairns (n 77) [29].
  80. 80 Pamic (n 11) [49].
  81. 81 Ibid [45].
  82. 82 Ibid [44].
  83. 83 Ibid [45].
  84. 84 Ibid [45].
  85. 85 (a pseudonym) [2025] VSCA 143, [90].
  86. 86 Pamic (n 11) [51].
  87. 87 Bromley v The Queen [2018] VSCA 329, [71].
  88. 88 R v Amp [2010] VSCA 48, [38].
  89. 89 Ibid [55].
  90. 90 Dyer v Harness Racing Victoria (Review and Regulation) [2019] VCAT 1792, [22].
  91. 91 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 3(1).
  92. 92 Ibid.
  93. 93 DPP v Anderson [2013] VSCA 45, [47].
  94. 94 Ibid [46].
  95. 95 DPP v Browne [2026] VCC 1335, [103].
  96. 96 (a pseudonym) [2025] VSCA 143, [2].

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