Complicity

Bodkin·5 Nov 2026

How Victorian law holds a person liable for an offence someone else commits: what counts as being involved (assisting, encouraging, directing or agreeing), what the prosecution must prove, how courts treat presence at the scene, withdrawal, and the 2014 reforms that replaced the common law.

Complicity concerns when a person who did not personally commit an offence is liable as though they had, because s 324(1) takes a person who is involved in the commission of an offence to have committed it.1 In Victoria, most aspects of the common law of complicity were abrogated as from 1 November 2014 and replaced with provisions of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) built around the concept of being "involved in the commission of an offence".2 The core provision is s 324(1), which provides that if an offence is committed, a person who is involved in its commission is taken to have committed the offence.3 Section 323(1) defines involvement by four forms of participation.4 Liability is derivative: it depends on proof that the offence was committed by another person.5 The common law remains relevant to interpreting the new provisions, and the common law on withdrawal from an offence has not been abolished.6 The scheme applies to any offence, whether indictable or summary.7 The statute changed the reach of complicity in both directions: it no longer requires the secondary party to be physically present, but involvement through an agreement to commit another offence requires awareness that the offence charged was probable, where extended common purpose at common law required only foresight of its possibility.8

General information about Victorian criminal law, not legal advice. Built from Bodkin's research answers and checked claim by claim against the judgments and the Acts in force on 5 November 2026.

Definition

Complicity under current Victorian law is statutory: if an offence is committed, a person who was involved in its commission in one of the ways set out in s 323(1) is taken to have committed it, and that liability is derivative, depending on proof that the offence was committed by another person.9 The core provision is s 324(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), which deems a person who is involved in the commission of an offence to have committed that offence.10 Section 323(1) defines involvement by four forms of participation: intentionally assisting, encouraging or directing the commission of the offence; intentionally assisting, encouraging or directing another offence while aware that it was probable the offence charged would be committed in carrying it out; entering into an agreement, arrangement or understanding with another person to commit the offence; or entering into one to commit another offence while aware that it was probable the offence charged would be committed in carrying it out.11

Involvement is not limited to physically carrying out the offence: a person is involved if they intentionally assist, encourage or direct its commission, or enter into an agreement, arrangement or understanding with another person to commit it, and may be involved by act or omission even if not physically present when the offence is committed.12 A note to s 323 says the person who committed an offence may include two or more people who entered into an agreement, arrangement or understanding to commit it.13

Common law concepts of complicity, such as aiding and abetting and acting in concert, have been abolished for the purposes of Victorian law.14 The common law remains relevant to interpreting the new provisions, because the similarities and differences between them and the common law inform how they are read, and the common law on withdrawal from an offence has not been abolished.15 At common law, in R v Lam, the Court of Appeal explained that the justification for liability arises from the contribution the person intentionally makes to the commission of the crime, and that this contribution can take different forms.16

The statute states the mental element expressly: under s 323(1)(a) and (b) the person must intentionally assist, encourage or direct, and under s 323(1)(b) and (d) the person must also have been aware that it was probable that the offence charged would be committed in the course of carrying out the other offence.17 In R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4), the court identified the state of mind question as one of the difficult issues the new provisions raise, saying that the more difficult questions concerned precisely what state of mind the secondary party must have with respect to the principal's behaviour and the elements of the charged offence, and particularly the causation of death,18 and that these questions could not be answered without considering and construing the new statutory complicity provisions.19

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill said the new provisions would improve the law of complicity by introducing simpler, internally consistent laws and abolishing problematic common law rules, and would allow simpler, more understandable jury directions.20

Elements or test

The accused's liability depends on the offence having been committed: under s 324(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), if an offence is committed, a person involved in its commission is taken to have committed the offence.21 If the elements are established and the offence is committed, the accused is liable to the maximum penalty for that offence, and under s 324(2) a person is not taken to have committed an offence if the person withdraws from it.22

Complicity by assisting, encouraging or directing is defined by statute: a person is involved in the commission of an offence if the person intentionally assists, encourages or directs its commission.23 A person is also involved if the person enters into an agreement, arrangement or understanding with another person to commit it.24 Both s 323(1)(c) and s 323(1)(d) require an "agreement, arrangement or understanding"; the other two limbs turn instead on intentionally assisting, encouraging or directing an offence.25 An agreement, arrangement or understanding need not be express: it may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, may be tacit, and may be formed moments before the offence is committed.26

Where the offence committed is not the one the accused assisted, encouraged, directed or agreed to, the accused is involved in it under s 323(1)(b) or (d) if aware that it was probable the offence charged would be committed in the course of carrying out the other offence, and the common law doctrine of extended common purpose is abolished by s 324C(2).27 The same awareness-of-probability test applies without any agreement: under s 323(1)(b) a person is involved in an offence if they intentionally assist, encourage or direct another offence, aware it was probable the offence charged would be committed in carrying it out.28 Section 323(1)(d) applies where the accused entered into an agreement, arrangement or understanding with another person to commit a different offence — "another offence" — and the offence charged is then committed; s 324(1) operates only "if an offence ... is committed".29

For encouragement, it does not matter whether the person who committed the offence was in fact encouraged.30 A person can be involved by act or omission, even if not physically present when the offence or an element of it is committed, and whether or not the person realises the facts constitute an offence.31

In Keogh v R, the Crown put its complicity case under s 323(1)(a): each accused intentionally assisted, encouraged or directed the other's offence and so was taken to have committed it.32 The trial judge directed the jury that to prove intentional assistance, encouragement or direction the prosecution had to show that, when the accused gave it, he knew or believed the essential circumstances of the offence.33 The Court of Appeal left undecided whether, on a complicity charge of rape, the Crown must prove the accessory knew or believed that the principal did not reasonably believe the complainant was consenting.34

In R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4), the Supreme Court ruled that for murder under s 323(1)(a) the prosecution must prove three things: the secondary party intentionally assisted, encouraged or directed the principal to commit the act that caused death; by that act intended that the principal would commit murder; and the principal murdered the deceased.35 For murder under s 323(1)(b), the secondary party must intentionally assist, encourage or direct a foundational offence such as an assault, intending the principal to commit it, and at that time must also be aware that it was probable the principal would, in carrying it out, kill or cause really serious injury with murderous intent.36

At common law, the plurality in Clayton v R explained that where a party to a joint criminal enterprise foresees the possibility that another might be assaulted with intention to kill or cause really serious injury, and despite that foresight continues to participate in the venture, the criminal culpability lies in the continued participation in the joint enterprise with the necessary foresight.37 The plurality also drew a distinction between liability as an aider or abettor and liability arising from participation in a joint enterprise.38 In Clayton v R, the High Court said that any change to the law of extended common purpose would involve altering the law of homicide, which is a task for legislatures and law reform commissions and not a step that can or should be taken in the development of the common law.39

Under s 324B, a person may be found guilty if the trier of fact is satisfied that the person is guilty either as the person who committed the offence or as a person involved in its commission, even though it cannot determine which applies.40 A person involved in an offence may be found guilty whether or not anyone else is prosecuted for or found guilty of it.41 A person involved under s 323(1)(a) or (c) may be found guilty even if the conduct was committed by a child presumed, under section 10 or 11 of the Youth Justice Act 2024, unable to commit the offence; s 324AB(2) does the same for paragraphs (b) and (d).42

R v Semaan described s 323(1)(d) as extended common purpose in its statutory form, now requiring foresight of a probability rather than a possibility, and said this shows the legislature meant to reduce the reach of complicity based on agreement.43

How courts apply it

At common law, simply being present at the scene of a crime committed by another was not enough to make a person an aider and abettor; something more was required, showing that the person was linked in purpose with the principal and contributed to what was taking place.44 In R v Al Qassim, the trial judge told the jury that in most cases more than mere presence was needed but that in some cases presence alone could amount to encouragement; the Court of Appeal held that this did not sufficiently make plain that presence without more would not suffice, and did not identify the additional matters said to constitute encouragement or assistance.45 The Court identified the danger that a jury may treat the case as one of the exceptional "mere presence" cases without properly considering whether there was anything more that turned the accused's presence into that of an aider and abettor.46

A similar point was made in Ward v R, a case about acting in concert (a doctrine since abolished by s 324C(2)), where the Court of Appeal explained that where a person does not directly participate in the acts needed to commit the crime, mere presence is insufficient, and there must be a degree of complicity, ordinarily exhibited by some participation or preparedness to participate in the principal offence.47 Presence is only required in order to give reality to the accused's participation or willingness to participate.48

In DPP v Lawson (Ruling No 3), a common-law ruling, Lasry J stated that aiding and abetting required proof that the principal offence was committed, that the accused knew the essential circumstances establishing it, and that the accused intentionally assisted or encouraged the primary offender to commit it.49 In the same ruling, dealing with joint criminal enterprise, Lasry J said that even where the agreement may properly be inferred from the circumstances of the commission of the offence itself, it is something in addition to participation, such as a statement or particular action, that is the evidence giving rise to that inference.50

In R v Lam (No 20), Redlich J noted a textbook writer's view that a direction based on the accused's presence at an affray, ready to intervene but without indicating this to others, would be deficient.51 Redlich J ruled that the jury may treat non-accidental presence as some, but not conclusive, evidence of aiding and abetting, read with the surrounding circumstances and earlier events.52

At common law, to fix an accused with accessorial liability by way of aiding and abetting, the prosecution needed to prove that the accused directly or indirectly expressed a willingness to assist the principal offender if required, even if that willingness did not in fact assist the principal, or the encouragement did not in fact encourage the principal.53 Under s 323(2) it is irrelevant whether the person who committed the offence was in fact encouraged, which entrenches the common-law position; but the prosecution must still prove that the accused intentionally encouraged the offence, which requires knowledge of the essential facts of the principal offence, including the principal's intention.54

The Court in DPP v Gebregiorgis explained that although an aider and abettor was, at common law, one who was present when the offence was committed, any necessity for presence has been removed by s 323(3).55 Where the accused is not physically present, a person may still be involved in the commission of an offence (s 323(3)(a)),56 and where liability under s 323(1)(a) rests on intentional encouragement, the accused must have knowledge of the essential facts of the principal offence.57

The statutory words "assists, encourages or directs" are read as ordinary English words, but they are the terms traditionally used at common law for an aider and abettor.58

In R v Al Qassim the appeal was allowed and a retrial ordered on two grounds: the failure to direct the jury that a co-accused's record of interview was not evidence against the applicant, and the inadequate direction on presence in aiding and abetting.59

Limits and exceptions

The critical provision is s 324C, which abolished the common law doctrines but carved out an express exception for withdrawal.60 The exception is signalled in the note to that section, which makes plain that the common law on withdrawal survives the abolition.61 Section 324(2) provides that, despite s 324(1), a person is not taken to have committed an offence if the person withdraws from the offence.62

At common law, a person is not responsible for the acts of other parties to an agreement if they withdrew from the agreement prior to its completion.63 Under the Crimes Act 1958, withdrawal may be relevant both to group offending and to complicity on the basis of assisting, encouraging or directing an offence.64

In White v Ridley, Gibbs J said a countermand must be made by words or conduct clear enough to bring home to the other person that the accused no longer wants the act done, and the accused must do or say whatever is reasonably possible to counteract the effect of the earlier request.65 Withdrawal must ordinarily be expressly communicated, but in exceptional circumstances it may be possible for an accused to have implicitly withdrawn from the agreement.66 It is usually more difficult to withdraw from an agreement at the time of the offending than beforehand,67 and withdrawal at that time will usually require greater conduct to undo the effect of the previous agreement.68

In White v Ridley the applicant's attempt to withdraw failed: he had sent a box with cannabis hidden inside it from Singapore as air freight, and then tried by telex to have the airline hold it in Singapore.69 Stephen J attributed the failure of the attempt partly to the telex, which suffered from two defects, its timing and its contents, and partly to the applicant's choice of a commercial airline to carry the box.70 Stephen J, with whom Aickin J agreed, held that the applicant's unsuccessful, tardy and reticent attempt, after apprehension of detection, to arrest a train of events he had himself set in motion had no effect in law on his criminal liability.71 The High Court divided: Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ dismissed the appeal, while Jacobs and Murphy JJ would have allowed it; Gibbs J accepted that the telex clearly revoked the request but held that the applicant did not do all that he reasonably could to undo its effect, because he did not tell the airline the box contained cannabis.72 Gibbs J framed the question of liability for the acts of an innocent agent as one to be answered by the application of similar principles.73

The note to s 324(2) says the common law recognises that a person may in certain circumstances withdraw from an offence, and gives White v Ridley, R v Tietie, Tulele and Bolamatu, and R v Jensen and Ward as examples.74

Withdrawal needs to be addressed only if the defence points to some evidence that the accused unequivocally countermanded or revoked the earlier agreement; the prosecution then bears the onus of disproving the withdrawal.75 Gibbs J said the general onus of proving guilt never shifts from the Crown; an accused relying on a countermand need only be able to point to evidence that one was given.76 Gibbs J said it seems entirely reasonable to insist that a person who has counselled or procured another to commit a crime, or has conspired with others to commit it, should accompany the countermand or withdrawal with such action as can reasonably be taken to undo the effect of the earlier encouragement or participation.77 Gibbs J said that withdrawal being implied from conduct "may well be correct in cases of common design", but found it difficult to envisage a case in which a person who had expressly procured an offence could sufficiently countermand it merely by conduct.78

In DPP v SA the judge did not accept that an accused withdrew just because his involvement lessened or he hesitated late in the attack, went back to the car and took no part in its second wave.79 For complicity by agreement, the relevant intention is the one the accused held on entering the agreement; a later change of intention before the offence does not matter unless the accused can be said to have withdrawn.80

Section 324 does not make a person liable for an offence that, as a matter of policy, is intended to benefit or protect that person.81 Assisting an offender after the event is dealt with separately in s 325 (Accessories): a person who, knowing or believing the principal offender to be guilty of a serious indictable offence, and without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, does any act with the purpose of impeding the offender's apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment commits an indictable offence.82

Recent changes

Before November 2014, the content of Victoria's law of criminal complicity — aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring, and the doctrines of acting in concert, joint criminal enterprise and common purpose — came from the common law, while the former s 323 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) provided that a person who aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an indictable offence could be tried and punished as a principal offender.83 At common law there were four recognised categories of criminal responsibility embraced by the concept of complicity, the first being the principal "in the first degree", usually present at the scene and committing the criminal act, with the remaining categories attracting liability on the basis of derivative responsibility as "secondary" parties.84 Those secondary categories were characterised as accessories before the fact, principals in the second degree and accessories after the fact; those who counselled or procured the commission of an offence were generally considered accessories before the fact, while those present during the commission of a crime who, aware that it was to be or was being committed, intentionally helped the principal or intentionally encouraged by words or by their presence were described as aiders and/or abettors and fell into the category of principals in the second degree.85 The derivative character of accessorial liability at common law was emphasised by the High Court in Likiardopoulos v The Queen, which traced the historical requirement that the principal offender be attainted before the accessory could be prosecuted.86 In Giorgianni v R, Gibbs CJ said that no one may be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence unless, knowing all the essential facts which made what was done a crime, he intentionally aided, abetted, counselled or procured the acts of the principal offender.87

The change was effected by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), which substituted Subdivision (1), "Complicity in commission of offences", of Division 1 of Part II of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and inserted new ss 324, 324A, 324B and 324C.88 The laws relating to criminal complicity in Victoria are found in pt II, div 1 of the Crimes Act, headed "Abettors, accessories and concealers of offences";89 Subdivision (1) of that Division was substituted in 2014 by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014.90 The scheme replaced most of the common law of complicity with a single statutory concept — being "involved in the commission of an offence" — and expressly abolished the common law of aiding, abetting, counselling and procuring and the doctrines of acting in concert, joint criminal enterprise and common purpose (including extended common purpose), leaving the common law on withdrawal in place.91 In DPP v SA the court described the complicity provisions of the Crimes Act as a statutory codification of complicity.92 The Court of Appeal has said the statutory complicity provisions show a legislative intention to replace common-law concepts, though some pieces of the common law, such as withdrawal, remain.93

The statutory complicity provisions came into force on 1 November 2014 and apply to offences alleged to have been committed on or after that date.94 Section 6 of the amending Act, which inserted the complicity provisions (ss 323 to 324C), commenced on 1 November 2014; the Act received assent on 9 September 2014.95 The transitional provision in s 623(3) provides that the Act as amended by section 6 applies to offences alleged to have been committed on or after section 6 commenced.96 An offence alleged to have been committed between two dates, one before and one after that commencement, is treated as committed before it, so the old law governs it.97

The new provisions were modelled in many respects on the common law of complicity but differ from it in others, by deliberate choice.98 Before 1 November 2014, in R v Wong, a judge in a Commonwealth drug importation trial held that the old split between a present aider and abettor and an absent counsellor or procurer was no longer valid, and that aiding and abetting does not require actual presence.99

Footnotes

  1. 1 Arpaci v The Queen [2020] VSCA 81, [51].
  2. 2 R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) [2019] VSC 339, [83].
  3. 3 Arpaci (n 1) [51].
  4. 4 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 323(1)(a)-(d).
  5. 5 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(1); R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) [2019] VSC 339, [98].
  6. 6 R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) [2019] VSC 339, [100]; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324C Note.
  7. 7 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(1).
  8. 8 Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) (n 2) [94], [96].
  9. 9 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(1); R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) [2019] VSC 339, [98].
  10. 10 Arpaci (n 1) [51].
  11. 11 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 323(1)(a)-(d).
  12. 12 Ibid s 323(1)(a), (c), (3)(a).
  13. 13 Ibid s 323, Note, in force from 2026-11-01.
  14. 14 Arpaci v The Queen [2020] VSCA 81, [51]; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324C.
  15. 15 R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) [2019] VSC 339, [100]; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324C Note.
  16. 16 R v Lam [2008] VSCA 109, [92].
  17. 17 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 323(1)(a)-(d).
  18. 18 Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) (n 2) [81].
  19. 19 Ibid [82].
  20. 20 Ibid [87].
  21. 21 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(1).
  22. 22 Ibid s 324(1)-(2).
  23. 23 Ibid s 323(1)(a).
  24. 24 Ibid s 323(1)(c).
  25. 25 Ibid s 323(1)(a)-(d).
  26. 26 DPP v SA [2024] VSC 28, [680]-[681].
  27. 27 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 323(1)(b), (d) and 324C(2).
  28. 28 Ibid s 323(1)(b).
  29. 29 Ibid s 323(1)(d), s 324(1).
  30. 30 Ibid s 323(2).
  31. 31 Ibid s 323(3).
  32. 32 Keogh v The Queen [2018] VSCA 145, [51].
  33. 33 Ibid [63].
  34. 34 Ibid [83].
  35. 35 Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) (n 2) [9].
  36. 36 Ibid [10].
  37. 37 Clayton v The Queen [2006] HCA 58, [17].
  38. 38 Ibid [20].
  39. 39 Ibid [19].
  40. 40 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324B.
  41. 41 Ibid s 324A.
  42. 42 Ibid s 324AB(1)-(2) (inserted by No. 32/2024), in force from 2026-11-01.
  43. 43 R v Semaan (Ruling 7) [2016] VSC 170, [13].
  44. 44 R v Al Qassim [2009] VSCA 192.
  45. 45 R v Al Qassim [2009] VSCA 192; Buchanan JA).
  46. 46 Al Qassim (n 44).
  47. 47 Ward v The Queen [2013] VSCA 60, [17].
  48. 48 Ibid [17].
  49. 49 DPP v Lawson (Ruling No 3) [2012] VSC 526, [53].
  50. 50 Ibid [51].
  51. 51 R v Lam (No 20) [2005] VSC 294, [70], [79].
  52. 52 Ibid [79].
  53. 53 DPP v Gebregiorgis [2023] VSCA 166, [47].
  54. 54 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 323(2); DPP v Gebregiorgis [2023] VSCA 166, [47]–[48].
  55. 55 Gebregiorgis (n 53) [47].
  56. 56 Ibid [47].
  57. 57 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 323(2); DPP v Gebregiorgis [2023] VSCA 166, [47]–[48].
  58. 58 Gebregiorgis (n 53) [46].
  59. 59 R v Al Qassim [2009] VSCA 192; Dodds-Streeton JA on grounds 1 and 2 and conclusion; Lasry AJA agreeing).
  60. 60 Nuramin v The King [2022] VSCA 215, [28].
  61. 61 Ibid [28].
  62. 62 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(2).
  63. 63 SA (n 26) [723].
  64. 64 Ibid [723].
  65. 65 White v Ridley [1978] HCA 38, [10].
  66. 66 SA (n 26) [723].
  67. 67 Ibid [723].
  68. 68 Ibid [723].
  69. 69 White (n 65) [2].
  70. 70 Ibid [13].
  71. 71 White v Ridley [1978] HCA 38, [16]; Aickin J.
  72. 72 White (n 65) [13]–[14], [24].
  73. 73 Ibid [10].
  74. 74 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(2) Note.
  75. 75 SA (n 26) [723].
  76. 76 White (n 65) [6].
  77. 77 Ibid [9].
  78. 78 Ibid [6].
  79. 79 SA (n 26) [724].
  80. 80 Ibid [729].
  81. 81 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324(3), in force from 2026-11-01.
  82. 82 Ibid s 325(1).
  83. 83 Likiardopoulos v The Queen [2012] HCA 37, [26]; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324C.
  84. 84 R v Wong [2005] VSC 96, [39].
  85. 85 Ibid [39].
  86. 86 Likiardopoulos v The Queen [2012] HCA 37, [26].
  87. 87 Giorgianni v The Queen [1985] HCA 29, [17].
  88. 88 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) Part II Div 1, notes to Subdiv (1) and ss 323, 324, 324A, 324B, 324C; endnote for No. 63/2014.
  89. 89 Nuramin (n 60) [27].
  90. 90 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) Part II Div 1, notes to Subdiv (1) and ss 323, 324, 324A, 324B, 324C; endnote for No. 63/2014.
  91. 91 R v Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) [2019] VSC 339, [83]; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 324C and note.
  92. 92 SA (n 26) [15].
  93. 93 Gebregiorgis (n 53) [42].
  94. 94 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 623(3) and the commencement note for the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014, No. 63/2014.
  95. 95 Ibid endnote for No. 63/2014 and notes to ss 323–324C.
  96. 96 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 623(3); endnote for No. 63/2014; note to s 324C.
  97. 97 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 623(4).
  98. 98 Novakovic (Rulings 2-4) (n 2) [89].
  99. 99 Wong (n 84) [58]–[59].

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